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Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively
- Authors
- Kim, Geofferey Jiyun; Kim, Bara; Kim, Jeongsim
- Issue Date
- 7월-2019
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
- Keywords
- War of attrition; Incomplete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Citation
- OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS, v.47, no.4, pp.326 - 330
- Indexed
- SCIE
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
- Volume
- 47
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 326
- End Page
- 330
- ISSN
- 0167-6377
- Abstract
- We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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