Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain
- Authors
- Yoo, Seung Ho; Cheong, Taesu
- Issue Date
- 6월-2018
- Publisher
- PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
- Keywords
- Supply chain; Quality management; Reward contract; Incentive; Target quality
- Citation
- TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW, v.114, pp.331 - 342
- Indexed
- SCIE
SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW
- Volume
- 114
- Start Page
- 331
- End Page
- 342
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/75412
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.tre.2018.01.005
- ISSN
- 1366-5545
- Abstract
- This paper investigates several incentive mechanisms for collaborative product quality improvement in a buyer-driven supply chain, and the impacts of those mechanisms on supply chain performance. The buyer, the Stackelberg leader, determines the sales price of a product while the supplier is responsible for production and product quality determination. We develop analytical models incorporating two reward schemes to better understand how the buyer can facilitate the supplier's quality improvement efforts. We offer managerial insights and practical guidelines for implementing quality management in the supply chain, derived from both an analytical comparison and numerical experiments.
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Collections - College of Engineering > School of Industrial and Management Engineering > 1. Journal Articles
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