Optimal robust allocation of private goods
- Authors
- Yoon, K.
- Issue Date
- 2018
- Publisher
- Korean Econometric Society
- Keywords
- Budget balance; Dominant strategy; Ex-post individual rationality; Robust mechanism design
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.29, no.4, pp.1 - 15
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Volume
- 29
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 15
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/80450
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- We characterize the optimal robust mechanisms for the allocation of private objects, where robust mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post no budget deficit, and optimal robust mechanisms are the ones that maximize the expected sum of players’ payoffs among all robust mechanisms. With a certain assumption on the payoff of the lowest possible type, we provide a complete description of optimal robust mechanisms with any number of players and objects. © 2018, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved.
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Economics > 1. Journal Articles
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