Refining the Art of Reforming the Corporate Governance of Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies: Venture Capital and Adaptive Efficiency

Abstract

The corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies (SCLCs) has attracted much scholarly attention. Through reviewing the extant literature in this field, it is clear that the overwhelming majority is theoretically underpinned by the lens of agency costs. Another important perspective, adaptive efficiency, has yet to be equally emphasized by scholars. Reflecting on the experience of American venture capital (VC), this article puts forth that the corporate governance of SCLCs has weakened the fundraising ability of Chinese domestic VC. Taking account of the positive link of a vibrant VC sector and the enhancement of adaptive efficiency, an obvious conclusion is that the corporate governance of SCLCs has already jeopardized the adaptive efficiency of the Chinese economy. Further, the normative implication of this finding is that the refined art of reforming the corporate governance of SCLCs ought to combine and harmonize agency costs with adaptive efficiency.