Managerial Ownership and Financial Analysts' Information Environment
- Authors
- Han, Sam; Jin, Justin Yiqiang; Kang, Tony; Lobo, Gerald
- Issue Date
- 4월-2014
- Publisher
- WILEY
- Keywords
- incentive alignment; information environment; information precision; managerial ownership
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, v.41, no.3-4, pp.328 - 362
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
- Volume
- 41
- Number
- 3-4
- Start Page
- 328
- End Page
- 362
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/98836
- DOI
- 10.1111/jbfa.12070
- ISSN
- 0306-686X
- Abstract
- Despite the importance of sell-side financial analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, little is known about how managerial equity ownership is associated with their information environment. Using Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens' (1998) framework for measuring the precision of financial analysts' information, we observe that managerial ownership is positively associated with the precision of financial analysts' public (common) and private (idiosyncratic) information, largely consistent with the alignment view of managerial equity ownership. These results are robust to controlling for various economic and statistical factors that might affect the inference.
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Collections - Korea University Business School > Department of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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