Knowing one's future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bas, Muhammet A. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Signorino, Curtis S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Whang, Taehee | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-05T12:58:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-05T12:58:01Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-06-15 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014-01 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0951-6298 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/99747 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, , which denotes the correlation between two agents' private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where =0 and =1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < < 1, a class of games which have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to estimate , as well as parameters associated with utilities. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD | - |
dc.subject | CRISIS BARGAINING GAME | - |
dc.subject | STRATEGIC INTERACTION | - |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC SANCTIONS | - |
dc.subject | UNCERTAINTY | - |
dc.subject | INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject | CHOICE | - |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONS | - |
dc.subject | INTERESTS | - |
dc.subject | ATTACKS | - |
dc.subject | POWER | - |
dc.title | Knowing one's future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Whang, Taehee | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/0951629813482054 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84891075053 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000328881300001 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, v.26, no.1, pp.3 - 34 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | - |
dc.citation.title | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 26 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 3 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 34 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Government & Law | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Political Science | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CRISIS BARGAINING GAME | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | STRATEGIC INTERACTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ECONOMIC SANCTIONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | UNCERTAINTY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CHOICE | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INSTITUTIONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INTERESTS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ATTACKS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | POWER | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Correlated preferences | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | fully structure | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | strategic choice models | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | structural statistical models | - |
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