Knowing one's future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating
- Authors
- Bas, Muhammet A.; Signorino, Curtis S.; Whang, Taehee
- Issue Date
- 1월-2014
- Publisher
- SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
- Keywords
- Correlated preferences; fully structure; strategic choice models; structural statistical models
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, v.26, no.1, pp.3 - 34
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS
- Volume
- 26
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 3
- End Page
- 34
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/99747
- DOI
- 10.1177/0951629813482054
- ISSN
- 0951-6298
- Abstract
- We generalize two classes of statistical sequential incomplete information games: (1) those resembling typical signaling games, in which a single agent represents each player, allowing for information to be revealed about future play; and (2) those in which each player is represented by a set of independent agents, where moves do not reveal private information. The generalized model we develop, the Correlated Agent Model, relies on a parameter, , which denotes the correlation between two agents' private information, i.e. the extent to which a player knows the future private component of her preferences. The independent agent and single agent models are special cases, where =0 and =1, respectively. The model also allows 0 < < 1, a class of games which have not yet been considered. We apply the model to crisis bargaining and demonstrate how to estimate , as well as parameters associated with utilities.
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
- Appears in
Collections - Division of International Studies > Division of International Studies > 1. Journal Articles
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.