On the optimal allocation of prizes in contests
- Authors
- Yoon, K.
- Issue Date
- 2014
- Publisher
- Korean Econometric Society
- Keywords
- All-pay auctions; Contests; Optimal structure; Prizes
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.25, no.1, pp.1 - 12
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Volume
- 25
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 12
- URI
- https://scholar.korea.ac.kr/handle/2021.sw.korea/100820
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.
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Collections - College of Political Science & Economics > Department of Economics > 1. Journal Articles
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