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On discrimination with competition between groups
- Authors
- Yoo, S.H.
- Issue Date
- 2019
- Publisher
- Korean Econometric Society
- Keywords
- Asymmetric information; Group inequality; Statistical discrimination
- Citation
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, v.30, no.4, pp.1 - 12
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
KCI
- Journal Title
- Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Volume
- 30
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 12
- ISSN
- 1229-2893
- Abstract
- Statistical discrimination explains that two ex ante identical groups can have two different qualifications due to asymmetric information and self-fulfilling equilibria. In the typical statistical discrimination models, however, there is no interaction between groups. This paper offers a statistical discrimination model with a continuous signaling in which two groups compete for employment. We compare exclusive equilibria, in which no worker in one group makes a human capital investment, with symmetric equilibria, and show that discrimination as well as non-discrimination can be Pareto optimal under a certain environment. © 2019, Korean Econometric Society. All rights reserved.
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