게임 리더십 규칙이 시장 성과에 미치는 효과 분석 - 스타켈버그 (Stackelberg) 리더십 하의 혼합유통경로 구조를 중심으로 -

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of game leadership rules on market outcomes in a mixed channel structure. A simple demand model is adopted from the literature, and two different ways of applying manufacturer’s Stackelberg game are analyzed and compared. By comparing the market outcomes from the two approaches, it is found that different equilibria are obtained from the two different ways of applying the price leadership. The results imply that the difference in interpretation of the game rule could affect the analysis results. Furthermore, graphical comparisons of the market outcomes show that the dynamic structures between manufacturers and retailers can be analyzed in different ways under even slightly different leadership rules. The results imply that researchers should clearly understand what is going on in the marketplace, and apply an appropriate game leadership rule when setting up and analyzing the game theoretic model.